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EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH A DIAGNOSIS OF FINANCIAL DEFAULT:
EXPECTANCY AND FEAR OF ITS ANNOUNCEMENT IN UKRAINE
 Abstract. This paper reviews the economic situation of European countries that today are
in deep external debt crisis and drew close to financial default, that can be announced by the
foreign creditors and investors who can not for some reason get in time or on demand their
money (the principal amount provided for use funds and (or) interest on them). However, in the
article the situation of Ukraine's foreign debt is considered, which significantly increased as a
result of financial management of banks, business entities and due to government and central
bank policies during the Orange epoch. The prospects for economic development in Ukraine are
outlined in view of external debt problem after coming into power the command of the Party of
Regions. 
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 Problem statement. Economic growth in the world economy that began in the early
2000's, was held under the deepening of the liberalization of international capital markets and
significant international financial flows. Successive phase of global economic growth ended in
global financial crisis in 2008. External debt crisis as a symptom of financial troubles affected
those countries, which in the process of public consumption and providing economic
development overestimated their abilities in the accumulation and service of foreign debt capital.
The stability of the euro area and the EU common market as a whole put into question  due to the
critical situation of the external debt of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, with signs of
declaration of default probability. The need for financial assistance to these countries by the
ECB, in particular the restructuring of problem debts EU would mean reforming their economies
and a reorganization of the financial system. In the short term this could lead to depreciation of
the Euro. If this were not done within the reserve funds of the European Monetary Union (EMU),
the IMF rather would help for the governments of those countries in exchange for their restrictive
fiscal measures. In the medium future it will deepen economic recession in the EU. The welfare
reduction in EU after debt restructuring and financial readjustment is imminent.  
Ukraine, which declared its policy on deepening integration into the EU common market, faced a
similar problem of service accumulated external debt, exacerbated today because of undeveloped
modern industrial production and low inclusion of its economy into European transnational
production and trade networks and the lack incentives to structural changes in this basis.
Import-oriented economic policy of the government led by Yulia Timoshenko (2005, 2008-2009)
and Yuriy Yekhanurov (2005-2006), and the formation via WTO  framework  a favorable
environment for the inflow of financial and banking credit transnational capital contributed in the
past five years to the development of local business, without proper opening the country to free
international capital movement of multinational companies into industrial production have
created signs of poor condition of the country's foreign debt. 
 Export-oriented policy of the government led by Mykola Azarov (2010) is designed to
remedy the situation, but due to high current external debt, expressed in foreign key currency,
Ukraine remains vulnerable to shocks related to the problems of the debt prolongation, low
global demand for export products, including metallurgy and industrial chemistry, violent
fluctuations in interest and exchange rates.  Under these conditions, most likely Ukraine will
have in the near future to repay the external debt by reducing domestic demand.
 Analysis of recent publications. Examining the problems of external debt, including
servicing the public debt, financial default diagnosis, its consequences and ways of prevention
(particularly in PIGS-counties), devoted a number of works of such leading foreign scientists, as
B. Eichengreen, C. Wyplosz, P. de Grauwe, D . Gross, R. Cabral, P. Krugman, C.Lapavitsas, R.
Nelson, K. Reinhart, K. Rogoff, N. Roubini, S. Cecchetti.
 Among domestic researchers who recently conducted study on the external debt of
Ukraine and also paid attention to analyzing and predicting the probability of default of the
Ukrainian economy should emphasize T. Vakhnenko, V. Georgishan, Y. Zhalilo, O. Kyrychenko,
A. Mnykh, O. Soskin, V. Tomareva, V. Shevchuk, V. Yurchyshyn.
 Unsolved aspects of the problem. In scientific literature there are no publications on the
comparative analysis of indicators of external debt of European countries with the similar
attributes of financial default parameters of the Ukrainian economy. Also, attention is devoted to
the relationship between external debt crises in the EU and the loss of welfare in the overall EU
market because of the weak effects of EU-enlargement by new economic areas and their
economic characteristics. It should be noted that welfare in EU common market can be achieved
today predominantly on the basis of Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian (neo-Ricardian) comparative
advantage, New economic geography and providing structural changes.
 Object-matter of the research and main material. The study is a comparative analysis
of indicators of external debt of European countries which have the characteristics of financial
default with similar indicators of Ukraine; detection of recent developments of external debt and
its service in Ukraine;  evaluation of current state economic policy of the Ukrainian government
and the National Bank of Ukraine in the context of the necessity of finding points of contact
between ensuring economic development and management of international capital flows.
 The default (country default) is a situation when inefficient state industrial, fiscal
(budgetary) and financial policy of government and monetary and exchange rate policy of the
central bank, and (or) haste assets & liabilities management of companies, banks and (or)
government of the country, directed at expanding the borrowed capital, lead to excess of the
critical financial dependence of country residents on external and domestic contractors (creditors
and investors). The financial dependence of the country can become critically high, especially in
disadvantaged situation in global financial and commodity markets. In these conditions it is
difficult to cover current debt by liquid financial assets at low domestic income and revenues
from foreign trade, and ultimately, at low national savings. Companies, banks and (or) the
government will be unable or not willing to fulfill their obligations in time and / or in full, which
will lead to a breach of credit and investment agreements and allow the creditors to initiate debt
collection procedures. 
 Systemic financial default on external debt includes public default of the government and
central bank on their external debt and default of private resident companies and resident banks
that received foreign loans under an obligation to pay the principal amount and accrued interest
to external borrowers, and also foreign portfolio investments (primarily into corporative bonds or
investments in certain financial assets) under the obligation to pay interest income to foreign
investors. It should be noted that subsidiaries (branches) of transnational companies and banks
operating in the country and economically (not by geographic jurisdiction) seen as residents, can
be considered as non-residents if they serve the process of lending and portfolio investment by
their parent companies or other subsidiaries located abroad for the counterparts in the recipient
country, that is when they actually act as mediators. According to the IMF definition “Gross
external debt, at any given time, is the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not
contingent, liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some
point(s) in the future and that are owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy [13].
Residence of economic subjects identified as the location of their business, as well as
domiciliation (place) of commitment appearance and payments for these commitments.
 Sovereign debt is related to external debt of country. Sovereign debt is sovereign bonds
issued in international currency (rather in Euro or US dollar) and sold by domestic government,
banks and companies to non-residents abroad, i.e. money borrowed from outside (it is equivalent
of borrowing money from other countries or public) to meet the country’s spending. It has to be
repaid on the maturity and will have to pay the interest for those borrowings. This will grow by
size if a country can not increase the income from taxes because of economic growth is very slow
or can not increase revenues from international investments and trade because of low global
economic presence and competitiveness. Financial default on sovereign debt is considered by
economists as a next crucial manifestation of global economic crisis after Dot com burst in 2000
and financial crisis 2008 which bring the whole global economy into default. 
 Important macroeconomic indicators, which enable to estimate the risk of occurrence and
announcement of country default on external debt are: total external debt of the country to its
nominal GDP, public external debt of the country (government and central bank external debt) to
its nominal GDP, private external debt of the country to its nominal GDP, the net international
investment position (IIP) of the country to its nominal GDP, foreign exchange reserves of central
bank to total external debt of the country,  total external debt of the country to goods and services
exports of the country.
Financial crisis and economic recession that engulfed the entire global economy over the
years 2008-2009, was clearly shown in countries characterized by weak industrial structure
dominated sectors of resource and labor-intensive goods, bloated public sector with significant
public expenditure and also in countries that are rapidly losing signs of global competitiveness,
particularly the location of production and tend to the economic periphery. 
However, the impact of the crisis sustained economies (including Ireland, Iceland, Spain,
Hungary), having a high level of competitiveness, knowledge-intensive industrial sectors, strong
tertiary sector (banking and non-banking financial, IT-services), but all of these economic
characteristics were acquired owing to the international  capital movement and these countries
have become net recipients of loans, direct and financial foreign investment and now face a
significant negative international investment position. 
Countries that showed during global financial crisis signs of debt crisis and indicate the
probability of default announcement are mostly the main Western European countries, the
so-called "PIGS” - Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Some economists entered into this rank
Ireland and it takes the form abbreviation PIIGS. Since the debt crisis facing Iceland, Belgium
and Hungary.
 Actual statistics clearly indicate the fiscal instability of the EU common market, the euro
area in particular and also the European Economic Area. According to the Maastricht criteria of
fiscal stability all public debt (internal and external) must not exceed 60% of GDP. It should be
noted that the governments of the European countries over the years accumulated considerable
debt  of GDP (Greece: in 2009 – 126,8%, 2010- 144%; Iceland: in 2009 - 107.6%, 2010 –
123,8%; Italy: in 2009- 115,2%,  2010 – 118,1%%;  Belgium: in 2009 - 97,6%, 2010 - 98,6%;
Ireland: in 2010 – 94,2%; France: in 2009 – 77,5%, 2010 – 83,5% ; Portugal: in 2009 – 76,9%,
2010 - 83,2%; Hungary: in 2009-78%, 2010 -79,6%; Germany - 72.1%, 2010 – 78,8%; Great
Britain - 68.1%, 2010- 76,5%; Austria: in 2009 - 69,3%, 2010 – 70,4%;) [13, 21 ].
Speaking of external government debt in the structure of total government debt, we
estimate, that in 2010 it was relatively large for Greece - 47,05% of GDP, Iceland – 33,37%,
Italy-29,78% , Portugal – 29, 63%. Governments of these countries have used for a long time
fiscal incentives for improving welfare by increasing domestic and foreign public debt.
Governments of Greece, Portugal and Spain actually created in their society illusion of a high
level of prosperity on average in Europe without providing for such living standard structural
changes and the required characteristics of global economic competitiveness (see Global
Competitiveness Index). Government expenditure on public consumption and inspiration of
economic development is not covered by mobilized public revenues, which depend on labor and
capital productivity in economy. As a result, in the euro area the "welfare bubble” of
PIGS-societies occurs. 
 It should be noted, the debt crises in the EU are deepening, and external obligations of
countries can not be covered by their insufficient revenues from foreign operations. A serious
problem in this regard is the inability to use intensively potential trade and investment benefits
that could get the EU countries from further enlargement through new members. We believe that
in the current integration format of EU the effects of comparative advantage in international
trade continuously diminish and transboundary competition for sales and favorable investment
and production locations aggravates despite the fact that comparative advantage effects
somehow still remain on the factually saturated EU common market.
  In addition, over the last decade European countries have favorable access to financial
capital at low interest rates owing to significant liberalization of international financial markets
and the formation of euro area [10].  Because of low regulatory framework for setting budget
deficit ceilings and/or for preventing enormous external debt such economies as Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Iceland reached critically high level of external indebtedness (see table 1). 
 During the global financial crisis of 2008 international investors began to withdraw their
receivables, which substantially accumulated in form of toxic assets, from all geographical and
functional segments whenever possible. Requirements of investors and lenders affected Greek
borrowers, particularly government and private sector. 
  Table 1
Indicators of the external indebtedness of countries with its critical level, compared with Ukraine
for the years 2008-2010
Countries Total
external
debt to
GDP, %
External
government
debt to GDP,
% 
External debt
of  monetary
authority
(National
Bank of
Ukraine) to
GDP, %
External
private
debt to
GDP, %
Net
interna-tiona
l investment
position
(IIP) to
GDP, % 
Foreign
Exchange
reserves
to total
external
debt, %
Total external
debt to exports
with goods
and
services,
 %
                                                            2008
Ukraine 56,60 6,66 2,63 47,31 -22,38 31,03 93,39
Spain 71,23 9,96 1,50 59,77 -37,56 1,77 399,15
Italy 50,01 22,87 0,01 27,13 -9,92 9,10 211,60
Portugal 135,26 No data No data No data -46,10 3,61 586,50
Greece 69,23 36,66 6,75 25,83 -34,21 1,40 849,48
Ireland 423,81 14,73 11,35 397,73 -32,81 0,09 946,59
Iceland 637,26 23,79 16,62 596,85 -20,95 3,19 600,35
                                                            2009
Ukraine 88,01 15,17 5,29 67,55 -34,25 25,66 190,58
Spain 88,32 14,94 2,07 71,30 -49,16 2,18 601,02
Italy 62,40 27,38 0,01 35,00 -10,19 10,05 364,13
Portugal 159,35 No data No data No data -57,41 4,31 897,99
Greece 90,48 48,70 10,88 30,90 -44,28 1,85 1605,62
Ireland 546,78 24,83 17,68 504,27 -51,88 0,18 1132,07
Iceland 990,86 42,15 13,41 937,30 -14,15 3,23 1931,67
                                                           2010
Ukraine 85,92 18,29 5,5 62,13 -28,32 31,25 169,44
Spain 95,7 16,5 2,82 76,38 -50,8 1,86 612,96
Italy 67,46 30,29 0,11 37,06 -11,27 8,45 504,16
Portugal
133,73 29,63 20,23 83,87 -62,6 5,34 995,0
Greece 101,51 47,05 42,66 32,92 -55,9 1,6 900,6
Ireland 592,31 29,78 53,67 508,86 -55,17 0,14 1792,54
Iceland 929,18 33,37 18,97 846,84 -15,81 0,05 1576,48
Calculated by author on the data of World Bank, IMF, official sites of central banks of EEA countries, National
Bank of Ukraine, Ministry of finance of Ukraine   
 At the beginning of 2010 Greece’s current debt obligations to international investors were
valued at 72,1 billion U.S. $. In April 2010 the Greek government, despite its newly issued
long-term bonds at high interest rates, announced the impossibility of paying the current external
and internal commitments (budget deficit amounted to 13,6% of GDP according to Eurostat) and 
made an appeal to the European Central Bank and the IMF to pay off debts.
 The consequence of these developments was the adoption by the European Commission
with the assistance of IMF “The program of stability and growth”, according to which Greek
government was forced to go on strict fiscal measures - to bring the budget deficit to 3% of GDP.
Greek Ministry of Finance outlined the targets to gradually reduce the budget deficit - up 8.7% in
2010 to 5,6% in 2011, to 2,8% in 2012 and to 2% in 2013 [5]. The course of governmental
reforms led to widespread social protests in the spring of 2010. In order to maintain the stability
of the euro area and prevent the uncontrolled outflow of capital resulting from the growing
distrust of international investors expressed to some EU-economies the governments of Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia (the countries-candidates on the rapid entry into European Monetary Union),
Italy, France and Portugal were among the first who began fiscal restriction, which brought about
a dissatisfaction within European society. Despite preventing measures, both governmental and
private foreign debt continued to grow steadily in 2010 in Greece, Spain and Ireland.
 Economists B. Eichengreen [4], P. de Grauwe [2] K. Reinhart [12], C. Wyplosz [16]
indicated that the probability of default contagion is significant in Portugal, Ireland and Spain. R.
Cabral sees one way to solve a problem - immediately to begin the process of restructuring the
public debt in the countries of euro area which have a critical external debt. Of course, this would
lead to loan restriction because of rising interest rates, deepening economic recession and
potential loss of lenders in the EU common market. At the same time it would give good signals
for credit markets and debtor countries face in the future with higher interest rates on new loans
and higher degree of responsibility and reliability within the European Community [1]. However,
economists believe that at the European Commission and EU Council level it is necessary to
implement directives concerning more tighten restrictions of external public debt ceilings for the
governments of euro area and other EU countries. 
Table 1 shows that the Ukrainian economy looks financially very stable compared with
European countries with a high risk of probability of default announcement. At the same time,
according to CMA Global Sovereign Credit Risk Report Ukraine in the end of 2010 took a 6th
place in the rank of countries which have the most risky sovereign debt positions [22]. 
While during the crisis period in 2009 all indicators of external financial dependence
significantly worse for Ukraine, in 2010 some of them gradually stabilized.  It should first talk
about the significant increase in foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, reduction of the
negative balance of international investment position by reducing a large part of corporate debt.
Important role played the stabilization of the hryvna exchange rate with the tendency of an
appreciation and the increase in GDP and export value. At the same time governmental and
central bank debt positions worse again. 
 Do the results mean that the quantitative improvement of some external financial
macroeconomic indicators will improve the quality characteristics of Ukrainian economy
development? Let it analyze external debt performance of Ukraine via economic processes that
lie behind it. 
 During the Orange period the deindustrialization of Ukrainian economy was followed by
increase of dependence on commodity imports and external debt capital. Instead of opening the
economy to foreign direct investment of large industrial transnational companies and
implementation by government and parliament liberal institutional and regulatory mechanisms
for improving the performance of Economic Freedom Index and the Global Competitiveness
Index, the Orange authorities gave impetus to expand activity of domestic medium and small
businesses that mainly consisted in the sale of imported consumer and industrial goods to
Ukrainian society and on this basis in development of consumer lending at still low purchasing
power of the Ukrainian population. The lending process to purchase imported goods actually
carried out by domestic banks, which in turn borrowed money for this purpose from big
transnational banks. It forced up final prices for the consumers and they remained higher than if
there were allowed transfer pricing mechanisms within multinational banks in Ukraine.
 Meanwhile Orange government could not create incentives to reduce the share of
influence on the economic system of low-technological industries, such as mining, metallurgy
and industrial chemistry. These industrial sectors are still creating the illusion that Ukraine has to
be considered as industrial country and the exchange of domestic exported goods with low added
value to imported goods with high added value explains large foreign debt. Moreover, for the last
five years, Ukraine has strengthened the status of the resource country, and its revealed
comparative advantages for resource products in international trade only increased compared to
other tradable goods.
 Global economic crisis and recession in the global demand exacerbated the problems of
foreign economic settlements of Ukraine. Change of the government team in 2010 led to a
radical revision of the principles of state policy. The new government coalition initiated fiscal
discipline and reduction of the disbalance in balance of payments by force of hidden
strengthening regulation of the import-oriented private sector. 
 Government external debt to GDP (%) decreased from 15.17% in 2009 to 14.18% in first
half of 2010. The new government coalition managed to get only part of the planned loan funds
from the IMF and the World bank. So in the credit line "help the authorities in carrying out
reforms and elimination of economic crisis”, which involves the allocation of 15.15 billion U.S.
dollars within 29 months, the government has already received in August 2010 to $ 1 billion to
cover the budget deficit [19] and $ 0,89 billion to reinforce the exchange reserves of National
bank of Ukraine. In this situation, debt repayment of the prior periods covered better than in 2009
due to increase the external government debt in the first half of 2010 compared with 2009 at 1.5
billion dollars (up 17.8 billion to 19.36 billion U.S. dollars)  and owing to GDP growth in 2010.  
 From January 2011 government had to get another 1.5 billion dollars [20] in exchange for
pension reform, fiscal stabilization measures, strengthening independence of central bank on
government and transparent foreign exchange framework, including removal quite a number of
foreign exchange restrictions to restore investor confidence and support inflow of capital. 
 The declared reforms have been postponed because of political struggle for business
interests of different business groups and due to resistance of the Ukrainian society of their
mechanisms. This leads to the situation when the government can not take the next tranche from
the IMF because it has the obligations which it can not or does not want to bear eventually.
 Prime Minister Mykola Azarov understood that it is possible to finance the budget deficit
not at the expense of the IMF loans, but via issuing sovereign eurobonds due to increasing
demand of international investors for them. Though the government eurobonds are an excellent
basis for activation of balance of payments in short-term period, it should to emphasize that this
external loan artificially maintain the welfare of inefficient Ukrainian public sector and provoke
in the long-term period problems of external debt service. Moreover, interest rates on eurobonds
are higher than the rate of the IMF (7,95% compared to 3,5% annually).  In order to conserve
unreasonable social standards relative to real factor productivity for keeping loyalty of potential
electorate and because of unwillingness to implement actual structural changes in the economy,
the use of more expensive debt instrument is well-reasoned for Party of Regions. 
 Some experts say that the Ukrainian government does not suffer because of termination
of IMF assistance. Since 2011 IMF tranches are no longer going to finance the budget deficit,
coming exclusively to the accounts of the NBU. 
 Mykola Azarov informed that on 16 February 2011 on the fulfillment of  Law of Ukraine
"On State Budget of Ukraine for 2011" Ministry of Finance carried out a bond issue of foreign
government loan in 2011 of $ 1.5 billion maturing in 10 years at an interest rate of 7,95% per
annum. Organizers of the issue are investment banks JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley and VTB
Capital PLC.
Value of total public debt to GDP will likely grow, if the Ukrainian government still finds
common ground with the IMF on fiscal stabilization. The financing of governmental investment
projects via World Bank loans in view of the holding Ukraine-2012 will increase the external
debt position. 
 Closed circle for a government coalition, represented basically by the Party of Regions, is
a lack of non-inflationary financial funds which shall be forwarded to realization of declared
social and economic reforms, insuring economic welfare of population. Get these funds today
without substantial opening of the country to transnational capital can only be through loans of
international financial and credit institutions. Instead of a liberal industrial and financial policy of
enabling the establishment and operating in Ukraine subsidiaries of TNC in real sector and the
creation of conditions for free international movement of corporate finance and banking capital
in Ukraine through the legislative consolidation of norms for functioning in the country
subsidiaries of transnational banks, the government chose unadvised alternative.  It is clear that
above mentioned processes would, of course, worse the net international investment position of
Ukraine, but contribute in the long-term perspective to structural changes, greatly expand the tax
base, increase revenue collection and reduce the pressure on the budget deficit. 
The government rejects such scenario and proposes another way. For obtaining regular loans
from the IMF, which in all other things being equal offers  governments to reduce the budget
deficit and ensure fiscal discipline, the Ukrainian government  plans pervasive fiscal restriction,
resulting in cuts in public spending and a primitive structural optimization - such as raising the
retirement age for women in the framework of pension reform, higher gas prices for utilities and
households by 50% from 15 April 2011, job cuts state employees within the administrative
reform, reduction of social benefits and also expenditures on education and science, etc., the
strengthening of the tax burden on the population and small and medium business that is not
affiliated with the government. Ukrainian society is constantly forced upon the idea that the IMF
requires the government to just such a scenario to solve the problems that there is no discussion
in the publicity for other complex alternatives that are in the arsenal of the structural
recommendations of the IMF.
  Following the logic of actual government, fiscal policy restriction would harmonize with
the regime of fixed exchange rate of the national currency. Of course, the managed-floating
exchange rate, which is practiced by the National Bank of Ukraine, in fact in certain time periods
may acquire characteristics of fixed one and stabilize exchange market through the active foreign
exchange interventions, carried out by the NBU on the open market. Scenario of fiscal restriction
with the managed-floating rate would lead already in the short- and medium- term to reduction of
the life standard of Ukrainian, lowering propensity to consume imported goods and services. At
the same time the reduction of external private debt would occur (if the business is not affiliated
with the government). Fiscal restriction measures should reduce the pressure of private sector on
external financial dependence of Ukraine.  Implanted under Orange period consumerism in
Ukraine would disappear.
  In the first half of 2010 external debt of National Bank of Ukraine decreased by 355
million dollars (from 6.21 to 5.855 billion U.S. dollars), indicating that debt repayments made on
long-term obligations that compensated the new loan inflows. Moreover, for a half year exchange
reserves rose by U.S. $ 4.4 billion owing to the active foreign exchange intervention aimed at the
purchase of key currencies on the open market. So we can talk about the sufficiency of exchange
reserves in Ukraine. Even though NBU received in August 2010 the first tranche in the IMF
credit line to reinforce its foreign exchange reserves in the amount of 890 million dollars, the
foreign debt of the NBU is not critical. It should be noted that the Ukrainian population and
exporters are today the major source of foreign exchange reserves of the NBU. It is actually
re-orientation of foreign exchange savings for the benefit of foreign exchange reserves of the
monetary institution. NBU seeks in the periods defined for the repayment of country's external
obligations (so, in the periods of capital outflows from the country), to mobilize its foreign
exchange reserves, maintaining macroeconomic stability. However, the majority of Ukrainian
population forced today because of rising cost of living at stagnant wages to sell the saved
foreign currency at artificially low exchange rate regulated by NBU, which means reducing
potential consumption of Ukrainian in future periods. 
 External debt of the private sector in 2010 declined up 67.55% (2009) to 62,13% of GDP.
This means that the private sector intensively repaid expired in 2010 long-term loans with the
maturity data. At the same time, the volume of new long-term credit obligations of private sector
is sharply reduced, that ceteris paribus in the next periods brings the business to downturn,
reducing susceptibility to lending by international credit money and eventually reducing a
domestic consumption. These processes also indicate the reduction of negative net international
investment position – up  -34.25% of GDP in 2009 to -28.32% of GDP in 2010.
Ukraine’s gross external debt jumped 5.12 percent in the fourth quarter 2010 as the
country sold eurobonds and private companies borrowed. The external debt totaled $117.3
billion as of Jan. 1, compared with $111.6 billion as of Oct. 1., 2010.
State foreign government debt jumped to $25 billion through the end of December,
2010, compared with $23.6 billion at the end of the previous quarter. Private companies’
debt rose to $50.8 billion, compared with $47.6 billion at the end of the third quarter.
Gross external debt jumped 13.5 percent in all of 2010. Of the total debt, 70.4 percent
was denominated in dollars and 10.7 percent in Euros. External debt due within the next 12
months totaled $47.3 billion.
Conclusions. Analyzing the external debt indicators for European countries (particularly
PIIGS) and Ukraine, assessing the recent trends in the formation and service of the external debt
of Ukraine, one can predict that the probability of financial default in Ukraine quite low. Planned
fiscal policy of government implies introduction of stricter state regulation of commodity and
financial markets in order to reduce external financial dependence of Ukraine, above all, the
dependence of the private sector as the main source of risk that after the Orange Revolution
began to reveal itself in a growing foreign private debt and, as a result, total external debt.
Reducing the international investment position and a negative balance of current operations by
curtailing imports flows of goods is likely to continue in the next periods and it inhibits growth
of external debt. However, fiscal policy of government, monetary and foreign exchange policy of
National Bank of Ukraine may hinder the qualitative structural changes which are necessary for
integration of Ukraine into the EU common market. Such changes can occur, as the experience of
CEE countries shows, under import-oriented economic policy and opening the country to free
international capital inflows in the industrial production. 
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